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Carrying out over two hundred executions in the last twenty years,'
Texas has dramatically demonstrated that the Bill of Rights-particularly,
the most fundamental right, the right to counsel-cannot be left in the
hands of partisan elected judges. The Texas judiciary has responded to the
clamor for executions by processing capital cases in assembly-line fashion
with little or no regard for the fairness and integrity of the process. In
doing so, it has shown the need for full habeas corpus review by inde-
pendent, life-tenured federal judges. However, the once "Great Writ" of
habeas corpus barely survives the restrictions put on it by the Supreme
Court and Congress. As a result, those most in need of the protection of
the Constitution-the "helpless, weak, outnumbered . . . victims of
prejudice and public excitement" 2 -often do not receive it, even in cases
where their lives are at stake.
* Director, Southern Center for Human Rights, Atlanta, Georgia; Visiting Lecturer in Law, Yale
Law School; Senior Lecturer, Emory Law School; B.A. 1971, J.D. 1975, University of Kentucky. The
author is most grateful to Michelle Drake, a student at Harvard Law School, for her assistance in
preparing this Article.
1. After the reinstatement of the death penalty by the United States Supreme Court, see Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding Texas's capital sentencing scheme), Texas carried out its first
execution on December 7, 1982. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, DEATH Row
U.S.A. REPORTER CURRENT SERVICE 1467 (Winter 2000) [hereinafter DEATH ROw U.S.A.]. By mid-
April, 2000, Texas had executed 211 inmates and had about 450 on death row waiting for execution.
See Claudia Kolker, The Art of Execution, Texas Style, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2000, at Al. The state
with the second highest number of executions, Virginia, had executed 76 since the reinstatement of
capital punishment. Id. Current numbers are available from The Death Penalty Information Center,
<http://www.essential.org/dpic/dpicreg.htmil>. See also Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Executed Offenders (last modified Apr. 7, 2000) <http://www.tdcj.state.tx.
us/statlexecutedoffenders.htm> (listing the 211 persons executed by the State of Texas since the death
penalty was reinstated in 1974).
2. See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
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Texas trial judges-some treating the appointment of counsel to defend
poor defendants as political patronage and some assigning lawyers not to
provide zealous advocacy but to help move their dockets3-have frequently
appointed incompetent lawyers to defend those accused of capital crimes.'
In 1999, trial judges successfully persuaded the governor to veto legislation
that would have made modest improvements in the legal representation of
poor defendants.5 The state's highest criminal court, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, has upheld death sentences even in cases in which
defense lawyers slept through trial.' In one such case, however, a federal
court did grant habeas corpus relief, finding that "sleeping counsel is the
equivalent to no counsel at all." 7 In another case, after the Texas courts
had upheld a conviction and death sentence based only on affidavits, a
federal court held an evidentiary hearing, made credibility findings, and
granted relief to a condemned woman whose lawyer was actively represen-
ting another participant in the crime who testified against her.'
Many people condemned to die in Texas have no access to competent
lawyers to represent them in post-conviction challenges to their convictions
and sentences. During a four-year period when it was responsible for
appointing lawyers to represent the condemned in post-conviction review,
the Court of Criminal Appeals repeatedly appointed lawyers who were
incapable of preparing petitions and filing them on time.9 It then punished
the inmates for the incompetence of their lawyers by denying them relief
over dissents that characterized the court's review as a "farce," "travesty,"
and "charade,""0 and "border[ing] on barbarism.""' In one case, a
federal judge found that the appointment of an inexperienced lawyer with
serious health problems to represent a condemned man "constituted a
cynical and reprehensible attempt to expedite [the] execution at the expense
of all semblance of fairness and integrity" and sent the case back to the
state courts for review.
12
3. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but
for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1855-57 (1994); Mark Ballard, Appointed Counsel Must
Now Win Judges' OK, TEX. LAW., Aug. 28, 1995, at 21; Mark Ballard, Gideon's Broken Promise,
TEX. LAW., Aug. 28, 1995, at 1.
4. Bright, supra note 3, at 1855.
5. See Bob Ray Sanders, Judges Decreed Death for Indigent Defense Bill, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, June 23, 1999, at 1, available in 1999 WL 6241494.
6. See infra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
7. See Burdine v. Johnson, 66 F. Supp. 2d 854, 866 (S.D. Tex. 1999). The Texas Attorney
General appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Id., No. 92-21034 (5th
Cir. Nov. 9, 1999).
8. See Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775, 808 (5th Cir. 2000).
9. See infra notes 141-56 and accompanying text.
10. Exparte Kerr, 977 S.W.2d 585, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (Overstreet, J., dissenting).
11. Exparte Smith, 977 S.W.2d 610, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (Overstreet, J., dissenting).
12. Kerr v. J'ohnson, No. SA-98-CA-151-OG (W.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 1999) (order dismissing habeas
corpus petition without prejudice).
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The importance of a fair process, effective advocacy, and thorough
review by independent courts is illustrated most clearly and compellingly
by the many people wrongfully condemned to death who-usually by mere
happenstance-had the good fortune to have competent lawyers, journalists,
or others take an interest in their case and prove their innocence. For
example, Randall Dale Adams, sentenced to death at a trial in Texas at
which he was represented by a real estate lawyer, was later exonerated
when evidence of his innocence came to light during the making of the film
A Thin Blue Line. 3 Volunteer lawyers and Rev. Jim McCloskey proved
that racial prejudice and the prosecution's failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence resulted in the conviction of an innocent man, Clarence
Brandley. 14  Also, volunteer lawyers-Scott Atlas from Vinson &
Elkins 5 and Douglas Robinson from Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom-proved that their clients, Ricardo Aldape Guerra and Frederico
Martinez-Macias, were innocent but had been convicted and sentenced to
death in violation of the Constitution. 6 Both defendants obtained relief
in federal habeas corpus proceedings and were released. 7  If any of
those men had been represented by lawyers who missed deadlines or failed
to conduct an investigation, like some lawyers assigned by the Texas
courts,"8 they would likely have been executed, instead of released.
Over eighty five people-including seven in Texas-have been released
from death row in the last twenty years after establishing their inno-
cence.' 9  In two separate cases in Illinois, journalism students and
professors at Northwestern University discovered the innocence of defen-
13. See RANDALL DALE ADAMS Er AL., ADAMS V. TEXAS 242-64, 280-333 (1991); MICHAEL
RADELEr ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE 60-72 (1992) (both describing how perjury and regional
prejudice played a role in convicting Randall Dale Adams of a murder for which he was later
exonerated.
14. See NICK DAVIES, wHITE LIES: RAPE, MURDER, AND JUSTICE TEXAS STYLE 307-09 (1991).
15. For a discussion of the success of Scott Atlas and a team of attorneys from Vinson & Elkins
in overturning the conviction and death sentence of Ricardo Aldape Guerra, see Nicholas Varchaver,
9 mm Away from Death, AM. LAW., Mar. 1995, at 81, 85-86.
16. See id. at 87; Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 979 F.2d 1067, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming
the district court's grant of habeas corpus relief to Martinez-Macias based on inadequate representation
at trial).
17. See Terri Langford, Former Death Row Inmate Leaves Prison and the U.S.: 35-Year-Old
Suspect Vows Never to Return to the United States, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Apr. 17, 1997, atBI1,
available in 1997 WL 2820088 (describing the release of Ricardo Aldape Guerra after fifteen years on
death row); Man FreedAfter 9 Years on Death Row, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 25, 1993, at 14D,
available in 1993 WL 9308485 (describing the release of Frederico Martinez-Macias after a grand jury
in El Paso decided there was not enough evidence to retry him).
18. See infra Part I.
19. See Mike Doring, Death Penalty Reforms Gain Backers in D.C., CHI. TRIB., Mar. 31,2000,
at I (reporting that as of that date, 87 persons had been released from death row in the 22 years since
the nation resumed executions); Sydney P. Freedberg, ExDeath Row Inmate Gets Walking Papers, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 17, 2000, at Al (reporting that Joseph Green became the 21st person in




dants condemned to die. But in Texas-which, unlike Illinois, does not
have a statewide public defender system at the trial level2-many death
row inmates never have their case reviewed by a competent lawyer,
filmmaker, journalist, or journalism class. As a result, wrongful
convictions, constitutional violations, and other serious injustices may
never come to light and be remedied.
Yet, despite the role that federal habeas corpus review has played in
freeing the innocent and vindicating egregious violations of the right to
counsel and other constitutional protections ignored by state courts, the
Supreme Court has erected numerous barriers to federal habeas corpus
review.' The Court has also adopted a standard for the effectiveness of
counsel that some courts construe as guaranteeing nothing more than a
warm body with a bar card beside the accused at the counsel table.'
Congress restricted habeas corpus review even more in the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which, among other things,
imposed a statute of limitations on petitions for habeas corpus relief.2'
What is happening in Texas is not limited to that state; other states
lack independent judiciaries and adequate indigent defense systems. Judges
are elected in thirty-two of the thirty-eight states that have the death
penalty.' The removal of judges perceived as "soft on crime" has made
it clear to those remaining on the bench that upholding the law in capital
cases comes at their own peril.' The quality of representation of those
20. DAVID PROTESS & ROB WARDEN, A PROMISE OF JUSTICE 122-208 (1998) (describing the
investigation by the class that demonstrated the innocence of four men, including two who were
released after 18 years in prison); Pam Belluck, Class of Sleuths to Rescue on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 5, 1999, at A16, available in LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (describing how journalism
students obtained a confession from another person to the murder for which Anthony Porter had been
sentenced to death); Pam Belluck, Convict Freed After 16 Years on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,
1999, at A7, available in LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (describing the release of Anthony Porter
after 16 years on death row).
21. See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, A STUDY OF REPRESENTATION IN CAPITAL CASES IN TEXAS
156-58 (1993) [hereinafter SPANGENBERO GROUP] (prepared for the State Bar of Texas) (reporting that
Texas is one of the few states with no state funding for indigent defense; instead, funding is provided
at the county level with significant differences from county to county in the level of funding).
22. See infra notes 213-20 and accompanying text.
23. See William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical
Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 91 (1995).
24. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 107, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266
(Supp. IV 1998) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255).
25. See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding
Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 779 (1995).
26. See id. at 760-66 (describing the removal of judges in Texas, California, and Mississippi);
Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate
and Remove Judges From Office for Unpopular Decisions? 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 310, 313-15, 331-
36 (1997) (describing the successful campaign to remove Justice Penny White from the Tennessee
Supreme Court in a retention election because the court reversed one death penalty case, followed by
a warning from the governor that other judges should consider "whether they're going to be thrown
out of office" before ruling on a case).
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accused of crimes has long been a scandal in many states. 27 Some states
do even less than Texas to provide lawyers for the condemned in post-
conviction review. For example, Georgia makes no provision for counsel
in a post-conviction review.28 The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the
denial of state habeas corpus relief in a capital case in which a bewildered
man with an IQ in the eighties had no lawyer at all and was forced to
represent himself.29 Also, Alabama pays only one thousand dollars to a
lawyer appointed to defend a post-conviction case.3"
Texas, however, provides particularly vivid and undeniable examples
of the need for full habeas corpus review. Not only have Texas judges
tolerated injustices, but in many cases, they have been responsible for them
by appointing grossly inadequate counsel.3' Texas has carried our far
more executions than any other state.32  Texas carried out its two hund-
redth execution before any other state had executed seventy-five.
Remarkably, Texas has been held out as a "model" by proponents of
speedier executions, more restrictive review of capital cases, and greater
deference by federal courts to the decisions of state courts. In August
1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit convened
a conference for state judges in the three states comprising the circuit, at
which Michael McCormick, the presiding judge of the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, a representative of the Texas Attorney General's office,
27. See generally Bright, supra note 3 (describing the inadequacy of counsel in capital cases);
Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV.
433 (1993) (contending that a "narrower definition of 'counsel' that encompasses only those licensed
attorneys with the requisite skill and knowledge to wage an adequate criminal defense" is needed);
Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right
to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986) (describing the failure to
establish and adequately fund public defender offices and other programs to implement the right to
effective assistance of counsel for poor people); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded
Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329 (1995) ("The failure
of the states to provide the resources necessary to give effect to the abstract values of fairness and
reliability in individual capital cases offends the Eighth Amendment."); Special Report: Poor Man's
Justice, AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 45-87 (collecting thirteen articles describing the inadequacy of
representation for indigent defendants in various parts of the country).
28. See Gibson v. Turpin, 513 S.E.2d 186, 191 (Ga. 1999) (holding that "there is no state or
federal constitutional right to an appointed lawyerupon habeas corpus"), cert. denied sub nom. Gibson
v. Head, 120 S. Ct. 363 (1999).
29. See id.
30. ALA. CODE § 15-12-23 (Supp. 1999) (providing for compensation of $50/hour for court time
and $30/hour for out-of-court time, up to a limit of $1,000, and although the dollar amounts increase
to $60/hour and $40/hour, respectively, on October 1, 2000, the total limit remains the same).
31. See infra Part I.
32. See Death Penalty Information Center, Number of Executions by State Since 1976 (last
modified Mar. 23, 2000) <http://www.essential.org/dpicldpicreg.html> (stating that since 1976,
Texas has executed 211 people, followed by Virginia with 76, Florida with 46, Missouri with 42, and
the rest of the states with 25 or fewer).
33. See Texas, Oklahoma Execute Convicted Killers, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 13, 2000, available
in Westlaw, ALLNEWSPLUS (reporting that Texas carried out its 200th execution and that Virginia
had the second highest number of executions, 72).
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and Edith Jones, a judge on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, explained
how capital cases were processed in Texas.' The following January, the
Florida legislature, in a frantic three-day special session-brushing aside
concerns about the dangers of execution of the innocent and the mentally
retarded, racial discrimination, and legal representation for poor people
condemned to die-and passed laws modeled after Texas law to speed up
the review of death penalty cases by imposing deadlines and timetables for
the processing of cases." (The Florida Supreme Court later unanimously
declared some provisions of the law unconstitutional.)36 Brad Thomas,
Florida Governor Jeb Bush's top policy advisor on the issue, said that the
goal of the legislation was to make Florida "more like Texas," explaining,
"[b]ring in the witnesses, put [the defendants] on a gurney, and let's rock
and roll."37 However, close examination of what often passes for justice
in Texas's state courts demonstrates that the Texas approach is anything but
a model and that the restrictions on federal habeas corpus review were a
grave mistake.
34. See David Firestone, Judges Criticized Over Death-Penalty Conference, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
19, 1999, at A16 (reporting that the conference agenda included "a detailed look at the process in
Texas"); Bob Herbert, Death Takes a Holiday, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1999, at A21 (describing the
invited guests at the conference as "some of the most rabid death penalty advocates from that most
rabid of death penalty states, Texas"); Bill Rankin, Upcoming Judicial Forum Under Fire As Slanted,
ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 10, 1999, at All (describing criticism by members of the defense bar of the
leading roles played at the conference by particularly outspoken and strident proponents of capital
punishment); Jonathan Ringel, Rough Times for Texans at Death Penalty Forum, FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REPORT, Aug. 23, 1999, at 1 (reporting allegations by defense lawyers that invited guest
speakers, Judge Edith Jones and Judge Michael McCormick, were the most "egregious" examples of
a conference featuring "too much discussion from prosecutors and judges who wanted to speed the pace
of capital cases").
35. See Steve Bousquet et al., Florida Speeds up Death RowAppeals, PITTSBURGH POSr-GAZErrE,
Jan. 8, 2000, at A4, available in 2000 WL 10872386 (reporting that Republican legislators at the
special session criticized judges who "discover 'technicalities' to delay death sentences and deny justice
to victims"); Marcia Gelbart, Limits Set on Appeals to Speed Executions, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 8,
2000, at IA (reporting that Gov. Jeb Bush's bill requires inmates to meet strict deadlines for filing
claims and limits the number of appeals they can file "with the goal of putting [inmates] to death within
5 years of conviction"); Sara Rimer, Florida Lawmakers Reject Electric Chair, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
2000, at A13 (describing defeat of a proposed amendment to Gov. Jeb Bush's bill that would have
allowed inmates to show that racial bias played a role in their sentencing); Larry P. Spalding, The High
Price of Killing Killers, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 4, 2000, at Al, available in 2000 WL 7592885
(quoting the bill's primary sponsor, Republican Victor Crist, as saying that Florida should be
.executing more people a year than [it] send[s] to Death Row, in order to catch up"); Jim Yardley, A
Role Model for Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2000, § 4, at 5 (reporting widespread criticism of
Gov. Jeb Bush's bill as a "hurried proposal" that is "possibly unconstitutional" and "might result in
executing wrongly convicted inmates").
36. Allen v. Butterworth, No. SC00-1 13, 2000 WL 381484, at *15 (Fla. Apr. 14, 2000).
37. See Yardley, supra note 35, § 4, at 5 (reporting Mr. Thomas's comments and quoting
Democratic State Representative Chris Smith, who stated at the special session that Texas should be
.our role model for killing people"); William Yardley, Bush s Adviser Key in Push for Quicker Death
Row Appeals, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 6, 2000, at 5B (describing Thomas's role in prompting
Florida's overhaul of the death row appeals process).
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I. Capital Trials in Texas: No Requirement that Defense Counsel Be
Awake, Prepared, Free of Conflicts, or Adequately Compensated
Michael McCormick, the presiding judge of the Court of Criminal
Appeals, has lamented that Texas "lost its sovereignty in 'right to counsel'
matters for indigent defendants" the day the Supreme Court held in Gideon
v. Winwright 8 that states were required to provide counsel in felony
cases.39 He has argued that a case-by-case assessment of whether the
accused needed counsel, which the United States Supreme Court previously
required, was "better reasoned and more true to principles of federal-
ism"' than Gideon and decried Gideon's "mischievous results."41 How-
ever, under McCormick's leadership the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
has maintained what some would call "sovereignty"-and others might call
lawlessness-in rendering the right to counsel all but meaningless.
The Court has upheld at least three death sentences from Houston in
which the defendant's lawyer slept during trial. The Houston Chronicle
described one trial as follows:
Seated beside his client-a convicted capital murderer-defense
attorney John Benn spent much of Thursday afternoon's trial in
apparent deep sleep. His mouth kept falling open and his head lolled
back on his shoulders, and then he awakened just long enough to
catch himself and sit upright. Then it happened again. And again.
And again. Every time he opened his eyes, a different prosecution
witness was on the stand describing another aspect of the Nov. 19,
1991, arrest of George McFarland in the robbery-killing of grocer
Kenneth Kwan. When State District Judge Doug Shaver finally
called a recess, Benn was asked if he truly had fallen asleep during
a capital murder trial. "It's boring," the 72-year-old longtime
Houston lawyer explained .... Court observers said Bean seems to
have slept his way through virtually the entire trial.42
The judge presiding over McFarland's trial in Houston permitted the trial
to continue on the theory that "[t]he Constitution doesn't say the lawyer
has to be awake."43 The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed over the
38. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
39. See Ex parte Jordan, 879 S.W.2d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (McCormick, P.J.,
dissenting).
40. Id. at 63 (referring to Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), which was overruled in Gideon).
41. Id. at 63 n.1 (quoting Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361-64 (1963) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
42. John Makeig, Asleep on the Job? Slaying Trial Boring, Lawyer Says, HOUS. CHRON., Aug.
14, 1992, at A35, available in 1992 WL 8083373 (describing trial proceedings in McFarland v. State,




dissent of Judges Charles Baird and Morris Overstreet." Judge Baird
wrote, "[a] sleeping counsel is unprepared to present evidence, to cross-
examine witnesses, and to present any coordinated effort to evaluate
evidence and present a defense."'45  He pointed out that although
McFarland had a second lawyer assigned to his case,
[n]either attorney interviewed a witness and neither attorney reviewed
the extraneous offenses that were to be later admitted. Benn decided
which witness he would cross-examine and he informed [co-counsel]
of his decision only after the State's examination. Thus, [co-
counsel's] preparation for cross-examination of his witnesses could
not have been effective because he did not know which witnesses he
was to question. . . Even more disturbing, Benn could sleep
during the direct examination and still elect to conduct cross-
examination.'
The Court of Criminal Appeals also upheld the convictions and death
sentences imposed on Calvin Burdine and Carl Johnson, even though Joe
Frank Cannon, the lawyer appointed by the trial court to defend them at
separate trials, slept during their trials.47 Cannon, known by his own
account for hurrying through capital trials like "greased lightning," had at
least ten clients sentenced to death. 8
Although the Texas court upheld Burdine's conviction, a federal court,
concluding that "sleeping counsel is equivalent to no counsel at all,"
granted habeas corpus relief to Burdine.49 The court found that Cannon
"dozed and actually fell asleep during portions of [Burdine's] trial on the
merits, in particular during the guilt-innocence phase when the State's solo
prosecutor was questioning witnesses and presenting evidence."5  In
finding that Cannon had slept, the court relied on testimony that he had
also slept during the trial of Carl Johnson. 5' However, Johnson never
received relief; he was executed in 1995.52 Another of Cannon's clients,
44. See McFarland, 928 S.W.2d at 525-28.
45. Id. at 527.
46. Id. at 527-28.
47. See Ex parte Burdine, 901 S.W.2d 456, 456 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (denying defendant's
state habeas corpus appeal despite a finding by the trial court that he was denied effective assistance
of counsel because his lawyer slept through the trial); see also David R. Dow, The State, the Death
Penalty, and Carl Johnson, 37 B.C. L. REV. 691 (1996) (describing the Johnson case, in which the
Court of Criminal Appeals did not publish its opinion).
48. See Paul M. Barrett, Lawyer's Fast Work on Death Cases Raises Doubts About System, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 7, 1994, at Al (describing Cannon's "sloppiness on vital legal procedure"), available in
1994 WL-WSJ 343264.
49. See Burdine v. Johnson, 66 F. Supp. 2d 854, 866 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
50. Id. at 859.
51. Id. at 859.
52. See Dow, supra note 47, at 694-95 (relating the history of Carl Johnson's death penalty case
and his ultimate death by lethal injection).
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Larry Norman Anderson, was put to death by Texas after the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that evidence that Cannon had a reputation for
incompetence and "habitually trie[d] capital cases in a perfunctory manner"
was not relevant to his performance in Anderson's case.1
3
Frederico Martinez-Macias was represented at his capital trial in El
Paso by a court-appointed attorney paid only $11.84/hour. 4 Counsel
failed to present an available alibi witness, relied upon an incorrect
assumption about a key evidentiary point without doing the research that
would have corrected his erroneous view of the law, and failed to interview
and present witnesses who could have testified in rebuttal of the pro-
secutor's case.55 Martinez-Macias was sentenced to death. He avoided
execution only because he had the good fortune to receive pro bono
representation from a Washington, D.C., firm, which proved in federal
habeas corpus proceedings that "the justice system got only what it paid
for, "56 woefully deficient representation that prejudiced Martinez-Macias.
After he was granted habeas corpus relief, an El Paso grand jury refused
to re-indict Martinez-Macias and he was released after nine years on death
row.
57
Federal habeas corpus relief was the only thing that kept Pamela Lynn
Perillo from being executed in Texas, even though her lawyer had a con-
flict of interest because of his active representation of the state's star
witness against her.58 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld her
conviction and death sentence on the basis of an affidavit from her lawyer
without even requiring an evidentiary hearing. However, a federal court,
after conducting a hearing, found that her lawyer, disbarred for lying to a
client in another case, was not credible and that the conflict adversely
affected his conduct of Perillo's defense, including his cross-examination
of his client who testified against Perillo.
59
Perillo illustrates the remarkable casualness with which defense
counsel is assigned to represent defendants facing the death penalty in
Houston. The trial judge initially appointed an attorney who had never
tried a capital case.' That attorney asked another lawyer with whom he
53. Anderson v. Collins, 18 F.3d 1208, 1215 (5th Cir. 1994). Anderson was executed by Texas
on April 26, 1994. DEATH Row U.S.A., supra note 1, at 16.
54. See Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 979 F.2d 1067, 1067 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming grant of
habeas corpus relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel).
55. See Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 810 F. Supp. 782,786-87,796-813 (W.D. Tex. 1991), aff'd,
979 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1992).
56. Martinez-Macias, 979 F.2d at 1067.
57. See Gordon Dickinson, Man Freed in Machete Murder Case, EL PASO TIMES, June 24, 1993,
at 1.
58. See Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775, 780 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming a district court's grant
of habeas relief because defendant's lawyer previously represented the state's witness in the same crime
and continued to represent her in other matters).
59. See id. at 783.
60. See id. at 786.
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"ran several machine shops" to assist in the defense.6" The judge appoin-
ted the lawyer, who had defended the state's key witness against Perillo,
a co-participant in the crime, at a separate trial.62 The lawyer continued
to represent the witness in obtaining immunity in testifying against another
participant, knew that the client-witness had given new and damaging
testimony about Perillo at that trial that was inconsistent with testimony the
witness had given at her own trials, and encouraged the witness to meet
with the survivors of the victim.6' The lawyer even went over the prior
testimony given at the two earlier trials by the witness, who was staying
at the lawyer's home, and "mapped out" the cross-examination he would
conduct the next day at Perillo's trial.' The lawyer failed to impeach the
testimony of his client-witness, thereby, according to the District Court,
not pursuing "a plausible defensive strategy that could have had significant
impact with respect to Perillo's punishment. "I
This was too much even for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit,6 which, in applying the standard for effective assistance of
counsel established in Strickland v. Wshington,67 has generally upheld
convictions and death sentences even in cases of conflicts of interest68 and
scandalously poor representation.69 Judge Alvin Rubin, concurring in the
denial of habeas relief in one capital case, observed that "[the
Constitution, as interpreted by the courts, does not require that the accused,
even in a capital case, be represented by able or effective counsel," 7" and
noted that, as a result, "accused persons who are represented by
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 786-87.
64. See id. at 788.
65. Id. at 796.
66. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
67. 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984) (holding that in order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel,
a defendant must first show that counsel's performance was deficient, and second, that this deficiency
prejudiced the defense).
68. See, e.g., Moreland v. Scott, 175 F.3d 347, 348-49 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding no conflict and
upholding conviction and death sentence where defense counsel, who was running for district attorney,
advised client to reject a plea offer which would have resulted in a sentence of 50 years on the theory
that the case would be reversed on appeal and, upon being elected district attorney, counsel would give
him a more favorable plea offer); Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1279 (5th Cir. 1995) (en bane)
(reversing district court's order and a panel opinion, see 986 F.2d 1478, that found a violation of
Beets's right to counsel because her lawyer obtained a media contract for her story and failed to
withdraw and testify as a defense witness); Russell v. Lynaugh, 892 F.2d 1205, 1216 (5th Cir. 1989)
(upholding a conviction and death sentence despite defense attorney's representation of a state witness
on previous occasions in criminal matters); Kirkpatrick v. Butler, 870 F.2d 276, 284 (5th Cir. 1989)
(upholding conviction and death sentence even though the defense attorney was an "attorney to and
fishing buddies with" the victim's family and failed to bring out evidence that the defendant may have
acted in response to a sexual advance by the victim).
69. See, e.g., infra notes 72-74.
70. Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., concurring).
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'not-legally-ineffective' lawyers may be condemned to die when the same
accused, if represented by effective counsel, would receive at least the
clemency of a life sentence."71 In one such case, a Texas lawyer, later
suspended from practice,72 presented no evidence about his client at the
penalty phase of the trial and then made no closing argument, instead
saying, "You are an extremely intelligent jury. You've got that man's life
in your hands. You can take it or not. That's all I have to say."' A
United States District Court granted habeas corpus relief, but the Fifth
Circuit, characterizing counsel's nonargument as a "dramatic ploy,"74
reversed and the defendant was executed. The court also reversed a district
court's finding of ineffective assistance for failure to present any mitigating
evidence, including the defendant's mental retardation, abuse by his
parents, and serious alcohol and drug problems.75
In another case, two judges of the court rejected a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel76 despite 230 findings of fact by the state trial court
regarding ineffective representation, including the lawyer's failure to object
to the state's use of peremptory challenges to exclude black venire mem-
bers, to obtain critical portions of transcripts of the codefendant's trial, to
consult with an independent ballistics expert, to preserve legal issues for
review, and to give an effective closing argument at the penalty phase.'
The state trial judge recommended that habeas corpus relief be granted
because of the poor representation, but the recommendation was rejected
by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in a five-to-four per curiam
decision.7' In dissenting from the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that the
lawyer's poor performance did not violate the right to counsel, Judge
DeMoss observed, "[i]f the state court findings in this case do not satisfy
both the 'ineffectiveness' and 'prejudice' prongs of Strickland, then in my
view there is no such animal as an 'ineffective counsel' and we should quit
talking as if there is." 79 The Fifth Circuit refused even to order a hearing
on a claim that a defense lawyer was intoxicated during a capital trial,'
71. Id. (emphasis in original).
72. See Suspensions, 56 TEX. B.J. 73, 73 (Jan. 1993) (stating that Jon R. Wood was suspended
for entering his client into an agreed judgment without the consent of his client).
73. Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1989).
74. Id. at 877 (denying habeas relief, even though the attorney presented no mitigating evidence
and only made a few perfunctory remarks at the sentencing phase).
75. See Williams v. Cain, 125 F.3d 269, 279 (5th Cir. 1997).
76. Westley v. Johnson, 83 F.3d 714, 721-24 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that, although Westley's
counsel was deficient in at least two areas of his defense, the deficiencies "did not operate to Westley's
prejudice at his trial").
77. Id. at 727-29 (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 728 (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 729 (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
80. Russell v. Lynaugh, 892 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1989).
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and has found no violation of the right to counsel in other cases where
defense counsel failed to present any mitigating evidence at the sentencing
phase of the trial.81 The Fifth Circuit's view that the right to counsel
means so little appears to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Williams v. Taylor,' holding that the failure to present
mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial constituted
ineffective assistance.83 However, it is apparent both from decisions in
which the Fifth Circuit has found ineffectiveness and from many in which
it did not that the Texas courts are assigning incompetent lawyers to
represent the poor in capital cases and providing no remedy for break-
downs in the adversarial system resulting from poor representation.
Although a poor defendant may pay with his life for the poor
representation he receives, he has no voice in the selection of court-
appointed counsel. A poor person accused of a crime is powerless to
enforce the right upon which all others depend, the right to counsel.'
Kenneth Dwayne Dunn's death sentence was upheld despite the fact that he
objected to the counsel appointed to represent him at trial.' After his
first death sentence was overturned because the court failed to adequately
transcribe the trial proceedings, the judge reappointed Dunn's attorneys.'
At first, Dunn attempted to represent himself, but the court appointed the
same lawyers who had represented him at his first trial as standby counsel,
despite Dunn's objection that he had filed a malpractice suit against them
and did not want them to represent him because of this conflict of
interest.' Then, he asked not to represent himself but to be represented
by different counsel.' Again, the court appointed the same lawyers. 9
81. See, e.g., Ransom v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 716, 723 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding the failure of
counsel to present any evidence of mitigation, including Ransom's terrible abuse as a child, "very
troublesome," but holding that it did not violate the Sixth Amendment); Rector v. Johnson, 120 F.3d
551,564 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that defense counsel was not ineffective despite failure to present any
mitigating evidence including "child abuse, family instability, a poor educational background, low IQ,
gunshot injuries, and that his mother was severely and chronically mentally ill"); Faulder v. Johnson,
81 F.3d 515, 519-20 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that counsel was not ineffective for failure to present any
mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase even though his reason for doing so was that he was
unaware of his right to present the evidence).
82. 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000).
83. Id. at 1497-98 (holding that Williams's constitutionally protected right to effective counsel was
violated by his trial attorney's failure to prevent mitigating evidence such as child abuse, mental
retardation, prison records, and lack of education).
84. Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services When
Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 793-96 (1997) (describing the
unsuccessful efforts of an indigent defendant to have his incompetent lawyer replaced).
85. See Dunn v. State, 819 S.W.2d 510, 515-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
86. See id. at 517.
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Over the dissent of Justice Charles Baird, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals upheld Dunn's second death sentence."
The poor quality of indigent defense in Texas has been well documen-
ted and widely recognized.9' However, Texas judges, in order to
maintain control over their dockets and receive campaign contributions
from appointed lawyers,' have been extremely hostile even to modest
attempts to limit their powers of appointment. In 1999, the Texas
legislature unanimously passed a bill that created the mere possibility of
public defenders' offices, and required indigent defendants to be appointed
attorneys within twenty days of arrest.' Texas judges mobilized to
convince Governor George W. Bush to veto the bill.' Despite
resounding denunciations, Governor Bush vetoed the bill.' Thus, the
90. See id. at 526.
91. See, e.g., SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 21, at ii (describing the situation in Texas as
"desperate"); Ballard, Gideon's Broken Promise, supra note 3, at 18-21; Debbie Nathan, Wheel of
Misfortune, TEX. OBSERVER, Oct. 1, 1999 (describing the lottery system in Bexar County, Texas for
assigning counsel to indigent criminal defendants); Bob Sablatura, Appointment of Defenders Varies in
Court; Some Judges Create Own Systems; Critics Call for Independent Office, HOUS. CHRON., Oct.
18, 1999, at A9, available in LEXIS, News Library, HCHRN file (discussing the problems of
permitting judges to appoint counsel for indigent criminal defendants).
92. See Ballard, Gideon's Broken Promise, supra note 3, at 18; Ballard, Appointed Counsel, supra
note 3, at 18.
93. See Tex. S.B. 247, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999), available in Texas Legislature Online,
<http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/gi-bin/db2www/tlo/bilhistbillhist.d2w/report?LEG=76&SESS=
R&CHAMBER=S&BILLTYPE=B&BILLSUFFIX=00247&SORT=Asc>; John Moritz, Public
Defenders Measure Defended by State Senator, Judges Who Oppose the Bill Say They Should Choose
Counsel for Indigent Suspects, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 5, 1999, at 4, available in 1999
WIL 6238340; Joe Stinebaker, Officials Size Up Bill Limiting Judges from Appointing Lawyers, Hous.
CHRON., June 2, 1999 at A1, available in 1999 WL 3999789 (explaining that the bill would have given
Texas commissioner courts the power to appoint attorneys for indigent defendants and possibly to set
up public defender offices).
94. See A. Philips Brooks, Bush Veto on Legal Aid Bill Draws National Scrutiny, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, June 22, 1999, at A6, available in 1999 WL 7416622; John Council, Judicial Furor:
Criminal Judges Irate Over Bill Stripping Them of Appointment Power, TEX. LAW., June 14, 1999, at
1 (noting that Bush's office "received numerous calls from judges throughout Texas ... who have
voiced their concerns (about] the legislation"); Melinda Prentice & Adolfo Pesquera, Indigent Defense
Bill Sparks Call for Veto, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS June 5, 1999, at B1, available in LEXIS,
News Library, San Antonio Express-News file ("State Districtjudges ... sent Bush a letter saying the
bill is unconstitutional and calling on him to veto it."); Sanders, supra note 5 at 1 (stating that district
judges were "determined to see [the bill] die at the hands of Gov. George W. Bush" because they were
unhappy that the legislation "would give county commissioners the responsibility to determine how
attorneys would be appointed for the poor ... [and would] give county auditors the authority to decide
how court-appointed attorneys would be paid"); Kathy Walt, Supporters Urge Bush to Sign Bill; Judges
Seek Veto, HOUS. CHRONICLE, June 5, 1999, at A31 ("Criminal district judges in Harris County voted
unanimously earlier this week to authorize Administrative Judge George Godwin to urge Bush to veto
the measure.").
95. See Bob Herbert, Texas Justice: It's an Oxymoron But Gov. Bush Doesn't Mind, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 1999, at A27, available in LEXIS, News Library, NYT File ("George W. Bush put his
vaunted compassion on hold Sunday night and vetoed a bill that would have modestly improved the
abysmal quality of legal representation available to indigent defendants in Texas."); Viveca Novak, The
Cost of Poor Advice, TIME, July 5, 1999, at 38 ("Texas's reputation as a state without tender mercies
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Texas judiciary, instead of protecting the right to counsel, has played a key
role in perpetuating the systematic denial of competent and effective
representation.
II. Post-Conviction Review: The Role of the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals in Appointing Incompetent Lawyers and Punishing Clients
A poor person accused of a crime is constitutionally entitled to a
lawyer only for trial96 and for one direct appeal.' But several important
avenues of review exist beyond one appeal: for example, state post-
conviction review, where a condemned inmate may raise issues that could
not have been presented at trial or on direct appeal, such as the denial of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at trial98 or the failure of the
prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence.9  Beyond that, a death-
sentenced inmate can seek habeas corpus review in the federal courts."°
A death-sentenced inmate has a statutory right to counsel for federal habeas
corpus,' 01 but counsel can present only claims that have been presented
to and decided by the state courts.'02
For several years, federally-funded resource centers, also called post-
conviction defender organizations, in Texas and other states employed
attorneys who specialized in capital post-conviction litigation. Those
programs provided representation in some cases and recruited attorneys in
others. 3 The Texas Resource Center was attacked by politicians, who
thought tax dollars should not be spent on defending murderers," and
for the accused is nowhere more apparent than in how it deals with defendants too poor to hire
lawyers.").
96. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-45 (1963) (holding that the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments require a state defendant to be provided with counsel at trial).
97. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-58 (1963) (holding that the Due Process and
Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment only require states to provide indigent
defendants counsel for their initial appeal).
98. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 667-96 (1984).
99. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84-85 (1963).
100. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Supp. IV 1998). For a discussion of the role that habeas corpus has
played in vindicating constitutional rights, see infra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
101. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q) (1994); see also McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856-57 (1994)
(holding that 21 U.S.C. § 848 provides inmates with a right to legal counsel in seeking federal habeas
corpus review).
102. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (Supp. IV 1998).
103. See Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., The Definding ofthe Post Conviction Defense Organizations as
a Denial of the Right to Counsel, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 863, 906-913 (1996).
104. See David Elliot, State Senator Sues Legal Resource Center, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Sept.
23, 1993, at B3, available in 1993 WL 6803110 (reporting Texas State Senator Jerry Patterson's
frustration with "11 th hour appeals" and the Resource Center's representation of Richard Lee Beavers,
who had previously volunteered for execution but changed his mind and filed an appeal); Kathy Walt,
Death Row Lawyers Win Bid to Keep Lid on Books, Hous. CHRON., June 22, 1995, at Al, available
in 1995 WL 5909378 (reporting on Senator Patterson's accusation that the Resource Center hired
1818 [Vol. 78:1805
Elected Judges and the Death Penalty in Texas
prosecutors, who felt the Resource Center attorneys were representing their
clients too zealously.'t 5 Congress eliminated all funding for resource
centers in 1996,1 and the Texas Resource Center closed shortly
thereafter. i07
The Texas legislature amended its post-conviction review law in 1995,
and provided that the complex task of representing those under death
sentence in post-conviction proceedings be assigned to individual
lawyers. 18  From 1995 to 1999, the legislature gave the Court of
Criminal Appeals the responsibility for "appoint[ing] competent counsel"
to represent the condemned."°  As the Dallas Morning News charitably
put it, the court did "a less-than-stellar job.""l0  The court's lack of
concern about the qualifications of the lawyers it appointed was apparent
from the outset when, while conscripting forty-eight attorneys to handle
cases, it appointed a longtime federal prosecutor to represent one of the
condemned."' The court was not even aware that the lawyer was an
assistant U.S. attorney and thus could not represent a death-sentenced
inmate."12
Equally disturbing was the Court of Criminal Appeals' assignment of
14 capital post-conviction cases to two of its former law clerks, initially
paid $265,000, which was 13 percent of the first $1.9 million paid to
lawyers by the court.' The two former clerks had no experience in
"public relations experts to mount campaigns for their clients" and used "taxpayer dollars to recruit
witnesses who are pressured to perjure themselves on the witness stand").
105. See Howard, supra note 104, at 913 (reporting that the Texas office had been criticized as
obstructionist," but that its director described the criticism as "the reaction to a vigorous defense bar
in capital cases"); Mark Ballard, Trial Captivates Death Row Bar, TEX. LAW., Apr. 26, 1993, at 1,
30 (reporting on allegations that the head of the Texas Resource Center suborned peijury and her
lawyer's response that the subpoena issued to her was part of a "witch hunt"); Susan Warren, Taking
Offense at Death Row Defense, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 7, 1993, at A20, available in 1993 WL 9632102
(reporting on prosecutors' frustration with the Resource Center's filing of what veteran capital defense
attorney Will Gray called "frivolous trash," and accusing the center of manipulating appeals through
the media).
106. See Howard, supra note 103, at 912-15.
107. See Christy Hoppe, McVeigh's Texas Lawyers Known for Their Battles Against Death
Penalty, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 9, 1997, at IA, available in 1997 WL 11498836.
108. See TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.071, § 2(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
109. Id. at § 2(c)-(d) (emphasis added).
110. Editorial, Death Penalty Reforms are Needed for the System to be Fair, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Dec. 20, 1998, at 2J, available in 1997 WL 23044432.
111. See Janet Elliott, Habeas Surprise: Court Orders 48 to Take Death Cases, TEX. LAW., Dec.
2, 1996, at 1.
112. Id.
113. See Ex-Court Clerks got $265,000 forDeath Row Inmates' Cases, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Oct. 4, 1997, at 26A, available in 1997 WL 11525334; Kathy Walt, Lawyers Who Aid Condemned
Paid $265,000/State Payments by Far Largest to Any Attorneys, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 3, 1997, at 33,
available in 1997 WL 13064743.
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such proceedings." 4 Even the most experienced lawyers could not take
on so many clients under death sentence and provide adequate representa-
tion to all of them.
The court assigned Ricky Kerr to a young lawyer who in his four
years in the practice had never been involved in the trial or appeal of a
capital case in any way."' The lawyer suffered severe health problems
that kept him out of his office in the months before he was to file a habeas
corpus application on behalf of Kerr."6  The lawyer so misunderstood
habeas corpus law that, as he later admitted, he thought he was precluded
from challenging Kerr's conviction and sentence' 7-7the very purpose of
a habeas petition. He filed what one member of the Court of Criminal
Appeals called a "non-application,"I" which failed to raise any issue
attacking the conviction.
After he and his family were unable to contact his lawyer, Kerr wrote
a letter to the court complaining about his lawyer and asking the court to
appoint another lawyer to prepare a habeas petition.119 Even though
prosecutors did not object to a stay,1'0 the Court of Criminal Appeals
denied Kerr's motions for a stay of execution and for the appointment of
competent counsel. 2 1  Judge Morris Overstreet, warning that the court
would have "blood on its hands" if Kerr was executed, dissented in order
to "wash [his] hands of such repugnance, " " saying:
For this Court to approve of such and refuse to stay this scheduled
execution is a farce and travesty of applicant's legal right to apply
for habeas relief. It appears that the Court, in approving such a
charade, is punishing applicant, rewarding the State, and perhaps
even encouraging other attorneys to file perfunctory "non-
applications." Such a "non-application" certainly makes it easier on
everyone-no need for the attorney, the State, or this Court to
consider any potential challenges to anything that happened at
trial.13
114. See Walt, supra note 113.
115. See Janet Elliott, Habeas System Fails Death Row Appellant, TEX. LAW., Mar. 9, 1998, at
1, 25; Christy Hoppe, Critics Say Case Shows Danger in Limiting Death-Row Appeals: Speeding
Execution Criticized After Error by Inmate's Lawyer, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Mar. 9, 1998, at IA,
available in 1998 WL 2519101.
116. See Walt, supra note 113.
117. See Exparte Kerr, 977 S.W.2d 585,585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (Overstreet, J., dissenting);
Elliott, supra note 115, 116 at 25 (reporting how Robert McGlohon, Jr., the appointed counsel,
mistakenly believed "he could not attack the validity of Kerr's conviction in the habeas appeal because
Kerr's direct appeal ... was not yet final").
118. Kerr, 977 S.W.2d at 585 (Overstreet, J., dissenting).
119. See Elliott, supra note 115 at 25.
120. See id.
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Even the prosecutors who sought Kerr's execution acknowledged that the
lawyer assigned to him "failed to comply with the letter and the spirit" of
Texas's law allowing post-conviction review. 24 The Texas Criminal
Defense Lawyers Association noted that in the court's Kerr decision, the
court had made it clear "that the duty of defense counsel.. . is discharged
by doing absolutely nothing."'"3
Other lawyers appointed by the court have also filed patently inade-
quate pleadings. For example, the petition filed by the lawyer the court
appointed to represent Johnny Joe Martinez was described by Judge
Charles Baird as follows:
The instant application is five and one half pages long and raises four
challenges to the conviction. The trial record is never quoted. Only
three cases are cited in the entire application, and no cases are cited
for the remaining two claims for relief. Those claims comprise only
17 lines with three inches of margin.'26
Although a state bar committee report found that handling a capital post-
conviction case requires, on average, somewhere between four hundred and
nine hundred hours of attorney time,"z records indicated that the lawyer
assigned to Martinez spent less than fifty hours preparing the
application." The lawyer did not seek any reimbursement for travel or
investigatory expenses or seek funds for expert assistance. 29 Martinez
wrote to the Court of Criminal Appeals, informing the court that his
attorney was failing to investigate his claims and asking to be assigned new
counsel. 30 The court denied Martinez's petition over a dissent by Judge
Baird that urged the court to remand the case to the trial court to determine
whether Martinez was adequately represented.'
The court also denied what it treated as an "[a]pplication for writ of
habeas corpus" filed by the lawyer it assigned to represent Bryan
Wolfe,' even though the pleading filed "appear[ed] to be a motion for
discovery."' Again, Judge Baird urged his colleagues to remand the
124. Elliott, supra note 115 at 26 (quoting the chief appellate lawyer for the district attorney's
office handling the case).
125. TCDLA Urges Members to Pass on Accepting Habeas Cases, TEX. LAW., June 22, 1998, at
4 (citing the resolution passed by the Board of Directors of the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers
Association on June 6, 1998) [hereinafter TCDLA Urges Members].
126. Exparte Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 589, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (Baird, J., dissenting).
127. See Elliott, supra note 115 at 26 (reporting the results of a 1993 study commissioned by the
State Bar of Texas, finding the median number of attorney hours to be 400 and the mean to be 900).
128. See Martinez, 977 S.W.2d at 589, n.2 (Baird, J., dissenting).
129. See id.
130. See Elliott, supra note 115.
131. See Martinez, 977 S.W.2d at 590 (Baird, J., dissenting).
132. Exparte Wolfe, 977 S.W.2d 603, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (Baird, J., dissenting).
133. Id. Judge Baird described the application as follows:
The instant application appears to allege ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but
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case for a determination of whether the inmate was properly represented,
and they refused.'1
In another case, Andrew Cantu resorted to representing himself after
the first two lawyers assigned by the court withdrew and a third failed even
to show up to interview him. 35 The first lawyer assigned to represent
him had represented his co-defendant. The second had represented the
state as an assistant attorney general in capital habeas corpus cases. At a
hearing held five months after the third lawyer was assigned to represent
Cantu, the lawyer admitted he had not visited Cantu, claiming that he did
not know Cantu's location.'36 (Texas had only one death row at that
time, which was located near Huntsville.)"3 7 The lawyer also admitted
that he had made no effort to contact an investigator or an expert and was
not familiar with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996,138 which established a one-year statute of limitations for filing a
federal habeas corpus petition.'39 Cantu was executed on February 16,
1999, without any state or federal review of the issues in his case."'
The court has also appointed attorneys who failed to file any petition
within the 180-day deadline established by statute,' 4' and then strictly
enforced the deadlines to preclude any post-conviction review.42 In
refusing to consider one untimely application from a lawyer it assigned, the
court noted that the "screamingly obvious" intent of the Texas legislature
in setting a time limit for the filing of post-conviction petitions was "to
speed up the habeas corpus process." 43 Judge Baird took issue with the
majority's conclusion that "speed should be our only concern when
also includes a wish list of discovery, research, and hearings necessary to represent
applicant. No cases are cited. No analysis of the law is presented. Indeed, even
the State recognizes this 'application' appears to be a motion for discovery.
Id.
134. See id.
135. See Paul Duggan, On Death Row, Not Even Dying Is Certain, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1998,
at A22, available in 1998 WL 22542235.
136. See State v. Cantu, 104th Dist. Ct. of Taylor County, Tex., No. 10,172-B, Transcript of
Hearing of Aug. 15, 1997, at 26 [hereinafter Cantu Transcript].
137. Brce Tomasco, Change of Address: Death Row's New Home Offers Fewer Amenities for its
Tenants, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 9, 1999, at 25A, available in 1999 WL 4127009.
138. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.) (Supp. IV 1998).
139. See id. §§ 101, 105 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)). See Cantu Transcript, supra note
136, at 27-28 (recording the lawyer's testimony at the hearing).
140. See Cantu-Tzin v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that because the habeas
petition was time-barred, the district court was not required to appoint counsel pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(q)(4)(B)), stay denied, 525 U.S. 1132 (1999).
141. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.071, § 4(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
142. SeeExparte Smith, 977 S.W.2d 610, 610 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (dismissing the petition
because it was filed nine days late); Ex parte Colella, 977 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)
(dismissing the petition because it was filed thirty-seven days late). See also infra notes 143-56.
143. Smith, 977 S.W.2d at 611.
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interpreting the statute," and argued in dissent that the court had failed "to
accept our statutory responsibility for appointing competent counsel." 1"
By strictly enforcing deadlines, the Court of Criminal Appeals sweeps
questions regarding unjust convictions or sentences under the rug. One of
the most egregious examples is the case of Henry Skinner. 45 Two days
before Skinner's application for post-conviction review was due to be filed,
his lawyer filed a motion in the Court of Criminal Appeals to extend the
deadline. On the day the application was due, the court ruled that the
motion for an extension should have been filed in the trial court.' 46 The
motion was filed the following day in the proper court, which ultimately
held it untimely and refused to hear Skinner's claims. 47
The court upheld the trial judge's ruling that Skinner was barred from
the post-conviction process because his lawyer had missed the deadline by
one day. In dissent, Judge Baird pointed out that the dismissal of the
application meant that no court would review the quality of representation
provided to Skinner by a former district attorney who had twice prosecuted
Skinner, had cocaine problems, and had a questionable relationship with
the presiding judge.' 41 Judge Baird observed:
Counsel [appointed to defend Skinner at trial] was the former
district attorney who had prosecuted [Skinner] on at least two prior
occasions. . . Moreover, when trial counsel served as district
attorney, it was well known he had a cocaine problem. Newspaper
reports indicated trial counsel, on his way to a fund raiser for [the
judge who appointed him to defend Skinner], was involved in an
accident and later admitted to the hospital for a drug overdose.
Because of trial counsel's known drug addiction, there was a
substantial investigation by the Attorney General's Office regarding
missing funds from the district attorney's office. After leaving office,
trial counsel was assessed a $90,000 bill from the I.R.S. A few
months later, trial counsel was appointed to the instant case and
ultimately paid almost $90,000. These facts demand a substantive
evidentiary hearing before an impartial tribunal.' 49
The Court of Criminal Appeals has also used strict adherence to the
Texas post-conviction statute to avoid correcting its own mistakes on direct
appeal. In 1993, the court explicitly overruled the holding it had used to
affirm Troy Farris's 1990 conviction and death sentence.'5" However,
144. Id. at 613-14 (Baird, J., dissenting).
145. Exparte Skinner, No. 20,203-03 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 2, 1998).
146. Id. at slip op. 1 (order).
147. Id. at slip op. 1-2 (order).
148. Id. at slip op. 5-6 (Baird, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at slip op. 5 (dissent).
150. See Riley v. State, 889 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (overruling Farris v. State,
819 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)).
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despite recognizing that it decided the issue incorrectly in Farris, the court
refused to reconsider the issue when Farris presented it on habeas,' and
Farris was executed on January 13, 1999.152
The court refused to hear another case because the lawyer failed to file
within the 180-day deadline.5 3 In dissent, Judge Morris Overstreet said
the court's action "borders on barbarism because such action punishes the
applicant for his lawyer's tardiness." '" The Austin American-Statesman
thought the court crossed the line. In an editorial, the paper said
"[b]arbarism is an appropriate description" of the court's refusal to hear
the petition. 5 The paper observed that the court's "disgraceful" action
would "only heighten the state's deadly reputation and make its judiciary
appear to be barbaric."156
During the four years it was responsible for appointing counsel, the
Court of Criminal Appeals not only appointed its cronies, the inexperi-
enced, and the incompetent to represent those facing death; it also
discouraged capable lawyers from taking capital cases and devoting the
time necessary to do an adequate job by limiting compensation to the
lawyers appointed and denying necessary expert and investigative
assistance.
Despite the finding by a committee of the Texas Bar that an average
of 400 to 900 hours of an attorney's time is required to handle a post-
conviction case,"' the Court of Criminal Appeals adopted a limit on fees
that compensated counsel for only 150 hours at $100/hour. 58 The Texas
Criminal Defense Lawyers Association warned potential appointees:
[T]he Court's limitations [on fees] will place you in the untenable
position of having to choose between competently representing your
client and performing about 250-750 hours of uncompensated work
or, if your practice precludes such a huge number of pro bono hours,
not being able to competently represent your client .... You should
also be aware that the Court has been routinely cutting vouchers
without explanation, and seemingly without regard to the necessity
151. See John Council, Writs and Wrongs:Farris Case Bolsters Concerns Over Subsequent Habeas
Petitions, TEX. LAw., Feb. 15, 1999, at 17.
152. See Michael Graczyk, Texas Executes Inmate for Deputy's 1983 Slaying, AUSrIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Jan. 14, 1999, at B2, available in 1999 WL 7399514.
153. See Exparte Smith, 977 S.W.2d 610, 610 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
154. Id. at 614 (Overstreet, J., dissenting).
155. A Disgraceful Vote, AuSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Apr. 27, 1998, at Al, available in 1999 WL
3608552.
156. Id.
157. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
158. See Cynthia Hujar Orr & E.G. "Gerry" Morris, Dear 11.071 Appointed Counsel:, VOICE
FOR THE DEFENSE, Apr. 1998, at 23, 24 n.1 (published by the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers
Association).
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of the work performed. Some attorneys have had vouchers reduced
by more than $10,000.159
The Association passed a resolution finding that the Court of Criminal
Appeals had "made it clear . . that it will not afford a citizen sentenced
to death any meaningful review, and further that it will often refuse to pay
necessary investigative and other expenses, forcing the appointed counsel
to, in effect, finance the proceedings themselves. " " The organization
urged its members not to ask for or accept appointments to capital cases
under these constraints.1
61
In 1999, the legislature removed the appointing authority from the
Court of Criminal Appeals and gave it to the trial courts. 62 The
legislature directed the Court of Criminal Appeals to create guidelines for
trial courts to use in appointing counsel. 63 The Texas legislature also
provided for attorney fees of $100/hour in post-conviction proceedings and
established a $25,000 limit on total expenditures for post-conviction
proceedings, including investigation and experts."
There is little reason to believe that these changes will improve the
quality of representation that poor people receive in post-conviction
proceedings. The Court of Criminal Appeals showed no concern for the
quality of lawyers it appointed in the four years it was responsible for
assigning counsel. Thus, there is little reason to imagine that the court will
issue guidelines that will ensure adequate representation. If anything,
giving trial courts the authority to appoint state habeas counsel may make
things worse. As previously shown, trial judges zealously guarding their
authority to appoint lawyers at trial are responsible for the indefensible
quality of representation in many cases.' 6'
By assigning incapable lawyers to defend the poor at trial and equally
incapable lawyers to represent the condemned in the post-conviction
process, Texas provides only a blurry appearance of fairness. But too
often, the reality is no reliable adversarial process at all. While the
legislature, the bar, the governor, and others all share the blame for the
poor quality of representation in capital cases in Texas, the state's judges-
who have taken an oath to uphold the Constitution, including the Sixth
159. Id. at 23.
160. TCDLA Urges Members, supra note 125, at 4.
161. See id.
162. See TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 2(c) (Vernon Supp. 1999).
163. See id. § 2(d).
164. See id. § 2A(a) (stating that expenditures beyond $25,000 are a county's responsibility); see
also Kurt Sauer, Bill Would Move Power to Habeas Courts, TEx. LAW., Apr. 26, 1999, at 2; John
Council, Reforms to the Habeas Reforms, TEx. LAW., Feb. 15, 1999, at 17 (discussing potential
modifications to the habeas reforms).
165. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
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Amendment's guarantee of counsel-have not only tolerated bad representa-
tion, but, by appointing incompetent lawyers, frequently have been directly
responsible for it. The role of judges in appointing bad lawyers and
swiftly processing capital cases has further diminished the reputation of the
Texas judiciary, which has long been tarnished by campaign contributions
to judicial candidates from groups that have cases before the courts. 166
III. The Partisan Election of Judges: The Triumph of Politics Over the
Rule of Law
One can reasonably ask how judges who have taken an oath to uphold
the Constitution and laws of the United States and Texas, including the
right to counsel, could play such a role in denying the protections of the
Constitution to those most in need of them. How can a judge be so indif-
ferent to injustice?
A large part of the answer is that Texas has partisan judicial
elections.167 Some judges run and are elected with an agenda, more like
a legislator than a judge.168  Other judges, once in office, appoint lawyers
to criminal cases as political patronage, more like a political boss than a
judicial officer. 69 Once in office, any vote that might be perceived as
"soft on crime" or as delaying executions-no matter how clear the law
requiring it-carries with it the risk that the judge will be voted out of
office in the next election.
In 1980, Michael J. McCormick, then the executive director of the
Texas District and County Attorneys Association, challenged in an election
166. SeeJohn Cornyn, Ruminations on the Nature of Texas Judging, 25 ST. MARY's L. REV. 367,
378 (1993) (stating, from the standpoint of a Texas Supreme Court justice, that "[t ] he gravest concern
that inheres in the elective system.., is that judicial candidates are compelled to raise campaign funds:
money and judges simply do not mix"); Robert D'Agostino, The Decline of the Law in the Texas
Supreme Court, 2 BENCHMARK 171, 171 (1986) (describing how the Texas Supreme Court "ignored
precedent, invalidated on Texas constitutional grounds long-accepted legislative enactments, interpreted
Texas statutes so as to render them meaningless, and glossed over and misinterpreted fact findings of
trial courts, all in pursuit of desired results"); Orrin W. Johnson & Laura Johnson Urbis, Judicial
Selection in Texas: A Gathering Storm?, 23 TEx. TECH L. REV. 525, 545-52 (1992) (discussing the
rising campaign costs in Texas judicial elections). See generally Stephen J. Adler, The Texas Bench:
Anything Goes, AM. LAW., Apr. 1986, at 1 (describing the nuances of partisan judicial elections in
Texas at a time when such races were heavily influenced by plaintiffs' lawyers).
167. TEx. CONST. art V, §§ 2, 4, 6-7; Cornyn, supra note 166, at 379 n.40 (stating that the nine
states that "select members of their highest courts by partisan elections are: Alabama, Arkansas,
Illinois, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia"). See also
Johnson & Urbis, supra note 166, at 543 (stating that Texas is one of the few remaining states in which
judges at all court levels are selected in partisan elections).
168. See infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Janet Elliott & Richard Connelly,
Mansfield: The Stealth Candidate-His Past Isn't What It Seems, TEX. LAW., Oct. 3, 1994, at 1, 32
(reprinting a campaign advertisement of a Texas Court of Criminal Appeals candidate that lists a series
of pro-death penalty positions).
169. See infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text; Bright & Keenan, supra note 25, at 802-03;
see also supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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a judge on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals who, according to
McCormick, "was not considered friendly to prosecutors."
70
McCormick ran on a "law enforcement philosophy," spoke out against the
court's doctrine of reviewing fundamental error in jury charges-which he
said was "thriving" on the court-and won the election. 171
There was no danger during the next 20 years he served on the court
that anyone would accuse McCormick, who became presiding judge in
1989,1 of not being friendly to prosecutors. Four years after his
election, McCormick, his briefing attorney, and his research assistant
published a law review article critical of the fundamental error doctrine,
attributing hundreds of reversals in two years to it, and advocating "a
retreat from rote appellate reversals of otherwise valid convictions." "
The following year, the Court adopted the position advocated by Judge
McCormick in his campaign and law review article and by the State in a
petition for rehearing, and abandoned the fundamental error doctrine,
deciding that instead an appellate court was to decide if an error was "so
egregiously harmful as to require reversal." 74
McCormick's "law enforcement philosophy" as a judge ranged from
criticizing the United States Supreme Court's decision requiring states to
provide lawyers for poor people accused of crimes' 75 to opposing bills
in the Texas legislature that would have banned capital punishment for the
mentally retarded and required that inmates be mentally competent to be
executed.' 76
Even former prosecutors and judges friendly to prosecutors are subject
to removal from the court if they make an unpopular decision. After the
Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction in a particularly
notorious capital case, Rodriguez v. State,'77 a former chairman of the
state Republican Party called for Republicans to take over the court.
78
The next year, Stephen W. Mansfield challenged the author of the
Rodriguez decision, Charles E Campbell, a former prosecutor who served
twelve years on the court, for his position. Mansfield campaigned on
170. John Sirman, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Presiding Judge Michael J. McCormick, 62
TEX. B.J. 271, 274 (1999).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Michael J. McCormick et al., Fundamental Defect in Appellate Review of Error in the Texas
Jury Charge, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 827, 827-28 (1984).
174. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
175. Exparte Jordan, 879 S.W.2d 61, 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (McCormick, P.J., dissenting)
(criticizing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
176. Janet Elliott, McCormick Critical of Ban on Death Sentences for the Retarded, TEX. LAW.,
May 31, 1999 at 4 (reporting that "McCormick actively worked to kill a bill that would have banned
capital punishment of the mentally retarded" and "even opposed" a bill following a U.S. Supreme
Court ruling prohibiting execution of the incompetent).
177. 848 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
178. See Elliott & Connelly, supra note 168, at 32.
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promises of greater use of the death penalty, greater use of the
harmless-error doctrine, and sanctions for attorneys who file "frivolous
appeals especially in death penalty cases."
179
Before the election, it came to light that Mansfield had misrepresented
his prior background, experience, and record." 0 Mansfield admitted
lying about his birthplace (he claimed to have been born in Texas, but was
born in Massachusetts), his prior political experience (he portrayed himself
as a political novice despite having twice unsuccessfully run for Congress),
and the amount of time he had spent in Texas.' It was also disclosed
that he had been fined for practicing law without a license in Florida,"
and that "contrary to his assertions that he had experience in criminal
cases" and had "written extensively on criminal and civil justice issues,"
he had virtually no such experience.113
Nevertheless, Mansfield received fifty-four percent of the votes in the
general election. " Texas Lawyer declared him an "unqualified
success."" It was later discovered that Mansfield had failed to report
.ten thousand dollars in past-due child support when he applied for his
Texas law license in 1992."'6 Judge Mansfield was arrested on the
University of Texas campus on Thanksgiving Day, 1998, and charged with
scalping the complimentary football tickets that judges receive." He
was reprimanded by the state's judicial conduct commission.'
88
179. Id.
180. SeeDo ItNow, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Nov. 12, 1994, at 32, available in 1994 WL
4033647 (calling for the reform of the judicial election system in Texas and for an immediate challenge
to Mansfield's election because he had "shaded the truth of virtually every aspect of his career"); Q
& A with Stephen Mansfield. "The Greatest Challenge of My Life," TEx. LAW., Nov. 21, 1994, at 8
(printing a post-election interview with Mansfield in which he retracts a number of statements made
before and during the election).
181. See Janet Elliott, Unqualified Success: Mansfield's Mandate-Vote Makes a Case for Merit
Selection, TEX. LAW., Nov. 14, 1994, at I (stating that Mansfield's suspect past and poor qualifications
make him a "poster boy" for advocates of nonpartisan judicial elections); Q & A with Stephen
Mansfield, supra note 180, at 8.
182. See John Williams, Election '94: GOP Gains Majority in State Supreme Court, Hous.
CHRON., Nov. 10, 1994, at A29, available in 1994 WL 4602404.
183. See Elliott & Connelly, supra note 168, at 32 (reporting that Mansfield's writings consisted
of a guest column in a local paper regarding a capital murder conviction, and two articles that appeared
in a journal for charter life underwriters); Elliott, supra note 181, at 1 (reporting that Mansfield was
unable to verify campaign claims regarding the number of criminal cases he had handled).
184. See Elliott, supra note 181, at 1 (pointing out that this result was similar to other partisan
elections around the state).
185. See id.
186. See Child Support Allegations Threaten Judge Seat, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Dec.
10, 1994, at 29, available in 1994 WL 4037619 (outlining the allegations of back child support by
Mansfield's ex-wife and his subsequent denial of the allegations).
187. See Janet Elliott & John Council, Scalping Allegation Lands Mansfield in Hairy Situation,
TEX. LAW., Dec. 14, 1998, at I (outlining the controversies that have plagued Judge Mansfield); Claire
Osborn, Judge Charged with Trespassing at UT, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Dec. 5, 1998, at B2,
available in 1998 WL 3633981 (outlining the circumstances surrounding Judge Mansfield's arrest at
the University of Texas).
188. See Pete Slover, Judge Reprimanded After Arrest Over Ticket Selling Incident, DALLAS
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Although some called Judge Mansfield an embarrassment to the
court," 9 Texas lawyer Kent Alan Schaffer put things in perspective in an
open letter to Judge Mansfield in which he suggested that the judge "leap
over the bench and into the well of the court" one morning during argu-
ments and beseech his colleagues:
Who among you dares to call me an embarrassment to this
court? I suppose it is not an embarrassment when we appoint
inexperienced lawyers to handle death penalty writs and then refuse
to pay them for the work they perform, or when we engage in
intellectual game playing in order to uphold wrongfully obtained
death penalties. None of you are embarrassed when we put someone
to death or uphold some severe sentence because of a missed
deadline, or when we pretend that a lawyer is not ineffective, just
because he slept through trial. Yet I get caught scalping a few lousy
football tickets and suddenly, I am the embarrassment.
In case after case, you strip people of their freedom and liberty
and ensure that the laws are used as the government's weapons
against the people, rather than the people's protection against the
government.... You wrestle the Goddess of Liberty to the ground
and ram her own sword though her just heart while the citizens of
this state watch in horror. And then you call me an embarrassment
because I was trying to make a few extra bucks on Thanksgiving
Day. 190
Shaffer assured Judge Mansfield, "if this court has any reason to be
embarrassed, ticket scalping, trespassing or leaving your little Pomeranian
dogs in your car are so far down the list that they are hardly worth
mentioning."' 9 '
Judges Baird and Overstreet-the dissenters in cases where the defense
lawyer slept, failed to present any issues, or missed the filing deadline-are
no longer on the Court of Criminal Appeals. Judge Baird was defeated in
the election of 1998. " Judge Overstreet unsuccessfully sought another
office. 93 With their departure, the previous defeat of other Democrats
MORNING NEWS, May 14, 1999, at A31, available in 1999 WL 4120830 (reporting Judge Mansfield's
reprimand by the Texas Conduct Commission).
189. See Elliott& Council, supra note 187, at 11-12 (arguing that the University of Texas arrest
raises new questions of Judge Mansfield's ethical fitness for the Court of Criminal Appeals).
190. Kent Alan Schaffer, An Open Letter to Judge Stephen W. Mansfield, VOICE FOR THE
DEFENSE, Jan.-Feb., 1999, at 6-7, reprinted in TEX. LAW., Mar. 1, 1999, at 22.
191. Id.
192. See Bruce Nichols, GOP Candidates Sweep 3 Seats: Appeals Court Will Be All Republican
for the First Time, DALLAS MORNING NEWs, Nov. 4, 1998, at 35A, available in 1998 WL 13115456.
193. See id. (stating that Judge Overstreet gave up his seat on the Court to run unsuccessfully for
the position of Attorney General).
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on the court, and Presiding Judge McCormick's switch to the Republican
Party, the Republican goal of taking over the court was achieved. For the
first time in its history, all of the judges on the court were Republicans;
just six years before, all the judges had been Democrats."9  In the
absence of Judges Baird and Overstreet, no one remains on the court to
raise a voice of dissent as the court dispatches the condemned to the
execution chamber without any hesitation or concern that poor represen-
tation may keep serious injustices from coming to the court's attention.
Independence is not tolerated on the trial bench in some Texas judicial
districts. For example, rulings against Houston's powerful district attorney
attracted an opponent and led to the defeat of Judge Norman E. Lanford,
a Republican, in 1992. Lanford suppressed evidence based upon an illegal
arrest of a man accused of killing a police officer.' 95 A prosecutor who
specialized in death cases, Caprice Cosper, defeated Judge Lanford in the
Republican primary.196  Lanford accused District Attorney John B.
Holmes of causing congestion of Lanford's docket to help bring about his
defeat.' 97  In the November election, Cosper was elected after radio
advertisements on her behalf attacked her Democratic opponent for having
once opposed the death penalty.' 98
Once elected, many Texas judges behave as other politicians do,
doling out favors and appointments to their supporters. In a survey of
Texas judges, over half said that judges they knew based their appoint-
ments to defend indigent defendants in part on whether the attorneys were
political supporters or had contributed to the judge's political
campaign."99 A quarter of the judges admitted that their own decisions
194. Id.
195. Lanford became the center of controversy after he ruled that there had been an illegal arrest
and ordered the acquittal of a man accused of killing a police officer. See Barbara Linkin,
Controversial Judge Lanford to Leave Bench, Hous. PosT, June 13, 1992, at A25.
196. Eric Hanson, Election '92, 6 Criminal Judges Re-elected, Newcomers Win in 4 Civil Courts,
Hous. CHRON., Nov. 5, 1992, at 33, available in 1992 WL 11455667 (as corrected Nov. 6, 1992,
available in the same citation).
197. The Texas Lawyer reported that "[courthouse records, which show a dramatic increase in
the number of cases on Lanford's docket in the months prior to the March 10 primary, lend credence
to his claim that prosecutors stalled cases in a calculated effort to provide ammunition for the judge's
opponent." Mark Ballard, Gunning for a Judge; Houston's Lanford Blames DA's Office for His
Downfall, TEX. LAW., Apr. 13, 1992, at 1.
198. See Alan Bernstein, Campaign Briefs, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 26, 1992, at A14, available in
1992 WL 11453883 (explaining the death penalty debate between the two candidates); Criminal Court
Races: Northcutt, Cosper, 4 Incumbents Deserve to Win, Hous. PoST, Oct. 24, 1992, at A28.
199. Michael K. Moore, The Status of Indigent Criminal Defense in Texas: A Survey of Texas
Judges (prepared for the State Bar of Texas Committee on Services to the Poor in Criminal Matters)
Survey Question 7g, h, (visited May 9, 2000) <http:l/www.uta.edu/polsl moore/indigent/ judge_
results.httm> (reporting that only 43.8% of judges responded that the judges they knew "never"
considered whether the attorney was a political supporter, and only 46.6% responded that judges they
knew "never" considered campaign contributions). Judges in the survey were specifically asked to
[Vol. 78:1805
Elected Judges and the Death Penalty in Texas
in appointing counsel were influenced by these factors. 2' In another
survey of Texas judges, forty-eight percent admitted that campaign
contributions are a "very" or "fairly" influential factor in their courtroom
decisions.' Lawyers' and court personnel's perception is that the
influence of campaign contributions on elected judges' decisions is even
more significant, with seventy-nine percent of the lawyers and sixty-nine
percent of the court personnel saying they believe campaign contributions
affect judges' decisions.2'
Using appointments as a reward for campaign contributions is not the
only way in which Texas judges misuse their power to appoint lawyers to
defend the poor. Almost half of the judges with criminal jurisdiction
admitted in a survey that an attorney's reputation for moving cases quickly,
regardless of the quality of the defense, was a factor that entered into their
appointment decisions. 03 In addition to deciding who will represent an
indigent defendant, Texas judges also decide when an indigent defendant
will become represented by counsel.' Many counties in Texas deter-
mine indigence on the basis of whether a defendant can post bail.2°
Hence, the power to appoint an attorney also carries with it the power to
ensure that a given defendant remains in jail. Some observers have said
that the time for appointment of counsel is manipulated to encourage
defendants to plead guilty in exchange for being sentenced to the time they
have already served in order to obtain their release.
20
Running for judicial office on a "law enforcement philosophy" or a
pro-capital punishment platform, while perfectly appropriate for candidates
discount their experiences in capital cases, but there is no reason to believe that their motivations for
appointment decisions would vary depending on the type of case. See id., instruction box on page 1
of survey. Indeed, the experience of people like Judge Lanford indicates that the political repercussions
of being perceived as sympathetic to persons facing the death penalty may provide even more of an
incentive to appoint attorneys who will not zealously defend their clients. See infra note 209 and
accompanying text.
200. Id., Survey Question 8g, h (reporting that 71.6% of judges polled said that they "never"
considered whether the attorney was one of their political supporters, and 75.7% said they "never"
considered whether the attorney had contributed to their campaign).
201. See Osler McCarthy, Campaign Gifts Sway Judges, 48% Say in Poll, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, June 10, 1999, at B1, available in 1999 WL 7415316 (outlining the results of a survey
conducted by the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas State Bar).
202. See id.
203. See Moore, supra note 199, Survey Question 7d (reporting that only 51.1% of judges polled
said that the attorney's reputation for moving cases, regardless of the quality of the defense, was
"never" a factor they considered).
204. See generally Ballard, Gideon's Broken Promise, supra note 3 (discussing the process of
appointing counsel for indigents in Harris County).
205. See Moore, supra note 199, Survey Question 11 (65.4% of defense attorneys questioned on
the appointment practices in their counties responded that whether or not the client was in jail was the
criterion used for determining indigency status).
206. See Ballard, Gideon's Broken Promise, supra note 3, at 19 (indicating that "an indigent
defendant spends so much time in jail awaiting action on his case that he jumps at the chance to plead
to a lesser offense, just to get out").
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for sheriff, the legislature, governor, or other non-judicial offices, is not
appropriate for judges, who have a constitutional responsibility to hold "the
balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused."' It is
equally inappropriate for judges to use their offices to reward their
supporters, expedite their dockets, or coerce guilty pleas. Judges are
charged with upholding the rule of law, including the protections of the Bill
of Rights, "undisturbed by the clamor of the multitude."" However,
in Texas, as in other states with elected judiciaries, judges ignore public
attitudes and their political supporters at the peril of losing their positions
in the next election.' As the defeat of Judge Campbell in Texas and
judges in other states demonstrates, a single decision can result in a judge
being tagged as "soft on crime" and voted out of office. As a result, the
rule of the law is often trumped by political realities.
IV. The Once Great Writ: Is There any Habeas Left in this Corpus?
The Texas judiciary has amply demonstrated the need for full review
of convictions and death sentences by independent, life-tenured federal
judges who are not in danger of being voted out of office for an unpopular,
but legally required, decision. However, habeas corpus review-the
process by which a person convicted in a state or federal court may petition
the federal courts for review of a conviction or sentence on the grounds
that it was obtained in violation of the Constitution-has been drastically
restricted by the Supreme Court and Congress.
The Supreme Court once described federal habeas corpus as "the com-
mon law world's 'freedom writ' by whose orderly processes the production
of a prisoner in court may be required and the legality of the grounds for
his incarceration inquired into, failing which the prisoner is set free"
210
and declared that "'there is no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired,'
and unsuspended, save only in the cases specified in our Constitution."
211
207. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
208. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 303 (1926) (quoting
Judge William Cranch's opinion in United States v. Bollman, 24 F. Cas. 1189, 1192 (C.C.D.C. 1807)
(No. 14,622)). See also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(2) (1990) (stating that a
judge "shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor or fear of criticism").
209. Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to
Intimidate andRemove Judges From Officefor UnpopularDecisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 308,313-15,
316-18 (1997) (describing the defeats of Justice Penny White of the Tennessee Supreme Court and
Justice James Robertson of the Mississippi Supreme Court after unpopular decisions in capital cases);
Bright & Keenan, supra note 25, at 760-61 (describing defeat of Chief Justice Rose Bird and two other
members of the California Supreme Court after campaigns against them based on their votes in capital
cases).
210. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712-13 (1961) (quoting Bowen v. Johnson, 306 U.S. 19,
26 (1939)).
211. Id. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963) (describing the historic role of habeas
corpus in protecting constitutional rights).
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As previously described in this Article, the intervention of the federal
courts has prevented a number of executions in Texas, including those of
people innocently convicted, after the Texas courts had upheld the convic-
tions and sentences.2 2
However, the Supreme Court no longer celebrates the role of habeas
corpus in vindicating the constitutional rights of those who face a loss of
life or liberty. The Court, concluding that federalism, finality, and comity
were more important than vindication of constitutional rights, began to
restrict habeas corpus review in the 1970s. The Court adopted and
rigorously enforced strict rules of procedural default, 2 3 excluded Fourth
Amendment claims from review,21 a made it more difficult for a habeas
petitioner to obtain an evidentiary hearing to prove a constitutional
violation, 25  adopted an extremely restrictive doctrine regarding the
retroactivity of constitutional decisions,216 made it easier for courts to
find any constitutional violation harmless, 2t7 and erected barriers to the
filing of a second habeas petition.2 8 Justice Harry Blacknun observed
212. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 740 (1991) (refusing a habeas action
because the state court's decision was based solely on adequate procedural grounds independent of
federal law); Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 408 (1989) (holding that federal habeas review was
unavailable to a defendant who, without good cause, failed to object to a questionable jury charge as
was required to preserve error under the state's procedural rules); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527,
533-34 (1986) (stating that, in the absence of a showing of cause, failure to properly raise a claim on
direct appeal will result in dismissal of a federal habeas action that is based on the foregone appellate
claim); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982) (holding that failure to comply with the state's
procedures for making a claim and inability to demonstrate cause for the default bars assertion of a
federal habeas challenge); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (applying the adequate and
independent state grounds doctrine to federal habeas actions and requiring a federal habeas petitioner
to show both "cause" and "prejudice" to escape the effects of a procedural default); Francis v.
Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976) (concluding that an attack on a state court conviction in which
a failure to object caused default of a claimed constitutional violation requires a showing not only of
cause but also of actual prejudice); Timothy J. Foley, The New Arbitrariness: Procedural Default of
Federal Habeas Corpus Claims in Capital Cases, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193, 209-12 (1989)
(criticizing the Court for injecting a "whole new level of arbitrariness" into capital cases by enforcing
strict procedural default and "having actual executions turn on whether the defendant was unlucky
enough to have a lawyer who failed to make the appropriate objection at the appropriate time").
214. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (barring federal review of the constitutionality of
searches and seizures if state courts provided a "full and fair" hearing on the issue).
215. See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992) (changing the standard for obtaining an
evidentiary hearing to the harder-to-prove cause-and-prejudice standard).
216. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 315-16 (1989) (holding, without briefing or oral
argument, that in collateral review retroactivity is to be treated as a threshold question and that new
rules generally should not be applied retroactively).
217. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (replacing the standard which required
reversal unless the court was confident beyond a reasonable doubt that error was harmless with a
standard of substantial and injurious effect on the verdict).
218. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494-95 (1991) (holding that the petitioner's inability
to know certain evidence at the time of the first petition fails to establish cause for a writ if other
potentially discoverable evidence existed that could have supported the claim).
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that the Court's "crusade to erect petty procedural barriers in the path of
any state prisoner seeking review of his federal constitutional claims" had
resulted in a "Byzantine morass of arbitrary, unnecessary, and unjustifiable
impediments to the vindication of federal rights. ,219 In one capital case
in which the Court refused to examine a constitutional violation, Justice
John Paul Stevens complained that the Court has "grossly misevaluate[d]
the requirements of 'law and justice' that are the federal court's statutory
mission under the federal habeas corpus statute" and instead "lost its way
in a procedural maze of its own creation."I
Congress restricted habeas corpus review even more by adopting the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.'1 The Act
imposes a statute of limitations on petitions for habeas corpus relief for the
first time in the nation's history,'m thus closing the courthouse doors to
Albert Cantu" and others like him if their lawyers miss the deadline for
filing. Another unprecedented provision of the Act restricts federal courts
from granting relief unless the decision of the state court "was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law." 4  The Act also limits when a federal court may conduct an
evidentiary hearing' and prohibits second or "successive" petitions for
habeas corpus relief except in very narrow circumstances.'
Because their habeas corpus proceedings commenced before April 24,
1996, when the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act was signed
into law and became effective, ' 7 the Act did not apply to federal habeas
review of the cases of Ricardo Aldape Guerra and Frederico Martinez-
Macias, in which constitutional violations resulted in convictions and death
219. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 758-59 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
220. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 541 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Dugger v.
Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 412-13 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court was
"arbitrarily imposfing] procedural obstacles to thwart the vindication of what apparently is a meritorious
Eighth Amendment claim").
221. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Actof 1996 § 107(a),28 U.S.C. §§2261-2266
(Supp. IV 1998) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255).
222. See id. §§ 101, 105, 106, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2255 Supp. IV 1998 (amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1) to establish a one-year statute of limitations). A statute of limitations of 180 days is
provided for states that meet certain standards for providing counsel in capital post-conviction
proceedings. See id. § 107, 28 U.S.C. § 2263 (Supp. IV 1998).
223. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
224. See AEDPA § 104(3), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1998); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.
Ct. 1479, 1505-11 (2000).
225. See id. § 104(4), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (Supp. IV 1998); M. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.
Ct. 1479, 1487-91 (2000).
226. See id. §§ 105, 106, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255, 2244(b) (Supp. IV 1998) (limiting any successive
habeas corpus petition to constitutional violations that result in conviction of an innocent person or
involve a new rule of law that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review).
227. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 323 (1997) (holding that the Act applies only to habeas
petitions filed after its effective date).
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sentences for crimes they did not commit;1 Calvin Burdine, whose
lawyer slept through his trial; 9 and Pamela Lynn Perillo, whose court-
appointed lawyer was actively representing the state's key witness against
her."3 If the Act had applied, the State might have argued that the
federal courts could not grant relief because of the deference they are now
required to give decisions of the state court-that is, because the decisions
of the Texas courts denying relief in those cases were not "unreasonable"
applications of the law. Just as the poor are entitled only to
"not-legally-ineffective" representation l under the lax standard of
Strickland v. Wzshington, 2 they are entitled only to not unreasonably
incorrect application of the law in cases where their lives are at stake. 3
A great federal judge from Texas, Irving Goldberg, pointed out that
in restricting habeas the courts were trading "the most precious legacy of
Lord Coke, the power to discharge from custody even one imprisoned by
order of the King . . . for a mess of pottage, a gruel composed of ques-
tionable notions of efficiency and vague notions of federalism."' He
expressed sadness "that there is rarely any escape from the executioner's
activities under the lethal blows rained upon the Great Writ, which seems
to become less great as the years pass."235
In restricting the power of federal courts to correct constitutional
violations in criminal cases, the Supreme Court and Congress have sacri-
ficed fairness for finality and reliability for results. It has become more
important to proceed with executions than to determine whether convictions
and sentences were obtained fairly and reliably. 6  Such a system
produces the results that many desire-convictions and death sentences-but
it does not produce justice. While it is unlikely in the current political
climate with so much demagoguery on the issue of crime 7 that Congress
228. See supra notes 15-18, 54-57 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
231. Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., concurring).
232. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984) (establishing a lax standard that
inquires only whether the representation was reasonable considering the circumstances and prevailing
professional norms, limits judicial scrutiny by being "highly deferential" to counsel's performance, and
requires defendants to overcome the "strong presumption" that their lawyer's actions "might be
considered sound trial strategy").
233. T. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1521 (2000).
234. Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 375 (5th Cir. 1978) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
235. Bass v. Estelle, 696 F.2d 1154, 1162 (5th Cir. 1983) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
236. See generally Stephen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of an Execution: Fairness v. "Process," 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 313 (1999).
237. See Stephen B. Bright, The Politics of Crime and the Death Penalty: Not "Soft on Crime,"
but Hard on the Bill of Rights, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 479, 483-500 (1995).
2000] 1835
Texas Law Review
will restore habeas corpus, the Texas judiciary demonstrates the need for
full habeas corpus review and the grievous error that Congress and the
Court made in curtailing it.
V. Conclusion
Texas has neither an independent judiciary nor an adequate system for
providing representation to the poor. As a result, the process by which
poor people are condemned to death is often a farce, a mockery, and a
disgrace to the legal system and the legal profession. The Texas judiciary,
responding to the perceived will of the state's voters, instead of protecting
rights, is not only ignoring constitutional violations, as so many elected
judges must do in order to stay in office. It is actively engaged in denying
rights to people by providing them grossly inadequate legal representation.
An accused may stand virtually defenseless facing the death penalty as his
lawyer naps at a trial that is in no way adversarial, and then be denied any
post-conviction review because his lawyer misses a deadline or fails to
raise any issues. The courts, as Judge Overstreet warned, have blood on
their hands.
The lethal virus that infects the Texas judiciary is not limited to the
Lone Star State. Adequate legal representation is a serious problem in
many jurisdictions throughout the United States in both capital and non-
capital cases.3 8  Judges have been voted off courts in other states 9
and the newly constituted courts have abruptly changed course and found
ways to affirm cases that previously would have been reversed.
24
Perhaps the day will come when state court judges will be able to
follow the law without regard to political considerations and the passions
of the moment. Perhaps members of the legal profession and others in
leadership positions will someday be successful in obtaining independent
state courts and strong and independent indigent defense programs. But
that day is a long way away. Until it comes, full habeas corpus review by
independent federal judges is essential to guarantee that the protections of
the Bill of Rights, including the most fundamental right, the right to
238. See supra note 27.
239. See supra notes 25 and 209.
240. See, e.g., C. Elliot Kessler, Death and Harmlessness:Application ofthe Harmless Error Rule
by the Bird and Lucas Courts in Death Penalty Cases-A Comparison & Critique, 26 U.S.F. L. REV.
41, 84, 89 (1991) (finding that following the removal of Chief Justice Rose Bird and two other
members of the California Supreme Court in 1986, the court "reversed every premise underlying the
Bird court's harmless-error analysis," displaying an eagerness that reflects "a desire to carry out the
death penalty" more than "jurisprudential theory").
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counsel, are not denigrated and disregarded-as they frequently are in the
state courts of Texas-but are fully enforced in order to ensure the fairness
and integrity of cases in which life and liberty are at stake.

